Patient-Physician Relationships in the Military by Maya, Harlye
The essence of military service "is the subordination of
the desires and interests of the individual to the needs
of the service. ".9
Military law and custom prohibit many acts that most
civilians would categorize as normal human behavior
under the catch-all justification "for the good order
and discipline of the military."2 Internal orders and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) alike
impose restrictions on dress and personal appearance, 3
speech,4 homosexual activity,' and even everyday
relationships. 6  While military personnel maintain
many of the same rights and burdens as members of
the civilian community, there is simply not the same
autonomy within the military as there is in the larger
civilian community.7 However, should that fact hold
true when it comes to one's medical decisions and the
relationships between patients and physicians in the
military?
When the law enters the field of bioethics, it provides
a rich language for exploring bioethical issues and
provides the tools for action and the means for dialogue.'
As the environment surrounding the meeting of the
physician and patient in the military changes, so does
the dynamic of the relationship and the parties' options
for action. This article begins with an overview of the
patient-physician relationship and how it functions in
both the civilian and military world. Next, it discusses
the military health care system and how members of
the military are barred from initiating malpractice suits
against the U.S. Government and individual military
physicians, and the possible impact this restriction has
on the patient-physician relationship. It then discusses
how the patient-physician relationship changes due to
the varying importance of the stakeholders and interests
present under different specific circumstances.
Throughout this article, the phrase "military patient" is
used as the generic term applying to a sick, injured, or
wounded member of the military who receives medical
care or treatment from medically-trained personnel
who make medically substantiated decisions based
on medical military occupational specialty (MOS)
specific training.9 The term "physician" refers to the
medically-trained personnel who administer treatment
and make medical decisions based on their medical
MOS training.10
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Generally, a few main principles comprise the relationship
issues include veracity and disclosure of information,
privacy, confidentiality, and fidelity." The first,
veracity, is important in a patient-physician relationship
because it is a part of the respect physicians owe to their
patients. Consent is not informed unless it is based on
truthful communication, and it invokes obligations of
fidelity and promise-keeping, and the trust necessary
for successful interaction and cooperation.12 Veracity
is not absolute, however as nondisclosure, deception,
and lying will occasionally be justified when veracity
conflicts with other obligations.' 3
The second principle, right to privacy, refers to
protection against unauthorized access to and reports
about a person.14 The rule of privacy can often conflict
with concerns for the safety and welfare of others.'" For
example, physicians are concerned with issues ofprivacy
when an HIV-positive patient refuses to inform family
members or lovers of his or her condition.' 6 The third
principle, confidentiality, is related to privacy in that
while patients lose some of their privacy when they grant
physicians access to their bodies and personal histories,
they maintain some degree of control of the information
generated about them through the confidentiality of their
physicians.' 7 When one person divulges information
to another with the implicit promise that the receiver
will not reveal that information to any other person,
the receiver should respect that implicit promise.'
The difference between a breach of confidentiality and
a breach of privacy in the medical setting is that an
infringement of confidentiality occurs when a physician
with the duty to protect information fails to protect
that information or deliberately discloses it without the
consent of the patient.' 9 A breach of privacy, on the
other hand, would occur if someone merely broke into
the hospital and stole the information. 20
Lastly, rules of fidelity or promise-keeping are rooted
in respect for autonomy, and provide a strong warrant
for an individual's obligation to keep promises. 2' Upon
making a promise, one creates an expectation on the
part of others who then rely on the promise and have
a valid claim to its being kept.2 Promises, such as the
promise to think of the patient's welfare and the related
promise that the physician will not abandon the patient,
are important to the patient-physician relationship. 23
There is another extremely important aspect of the
civilian patient-physician relationship: the tort. One of
the law's oldest aims is to resolve disputes. American
law fulfills this aim partly through the law of torts,
settling the dispute between the injurer and the victim
and restoring the victim to his or her prior well-being. 24
Building on tort doctrines, courts have developed the
principle of informed consent, which serves three
bioethical goals: (1) to help resolve disputes over
injuries caused by a doctor's failure to inform a patient
adequately; (2) to recompense -however crudely -the
injured patient; and (3) -more ambitiously -to improve
the way doctors treat patients.25 Tort law's loftiest goal
in the medical realm should be to improve the way
doctors treat their patients.26 The possible consequences
for neglectful or reckless acts give doctors an incentive
to provide patients with the best care possible.
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Even in the civilian world there is an inherent
imbalance of power between the patient and the
physician. Within the military, unique pressures only
accentuate this imbalance of power, as the military is
a hierarchical organization and its operation is based
on the presumption of obedience.27 Because of this,
both military physicians and patients face challenges
different from their civilian counterparts.
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The discipline and "order-centric" nature of the military
inherently reduces a military patient's autonomy in
comparison to a civilian patient's autonomy. Like the
physician, a military patient must answer to the military
command which has its own set of expectations for
the cooperation of the soldiers on medical matters. A
soldier on active duty will usually be required to accept
medical care considered necessary to protect his own
life or the life of those around him.28 Additionally,
unlike their patient counterparts in a civilian setting,
patients in a military setting may suffer from numerous
psychological illnesses, which can occur from the
stresses of combat or from the guilt associated with a
medical evacuation from the combat zone. 29 There is
also a pre-existing reduced state of autonomy when it
comes to medical decisions involving vaccinations,
as the President of the United States may mandate
vaccinations despite the patient's refusal.30 The level
with which the command and nation's interests come
before that of the patient varies depending on the stage
of military life.
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The Manual for Courts-Martial defines the term
"medical officer" as "an officer of the Medical Corps
of the Army, an officer of the Medical Corps of the
Navy, or an officer in the Air Force designated as a
medical officer." 3' Health care professionals serving
in the military play a variety of roles, including,
for example, pathologists, primary care physicians
and nurses, battlefield clinicians, and advisors to
interrogators. 32 However, what separates military from
civilian physicians is that once he or she is a member
of a military branch, the physician is subject to the
same chains of command, rules, restrictions, and bodies
of law as all other members of the military, including
criminal consequences for failing to follow orders.33
These competing interests give rise to the issue of "dual
loyalty," which transpires when the physician feels
caught between the obligation to help another human
being under his or her care and a demand (formal or
informal, explicit or implicit) to act on behalf of some
other entity.34 This dual loyalty conflict between the
practice of medicine, the interests of the patient, and
pressures from the military and command produces the
majority of biomedical issues and highlights the inherent
conflict between patients and their doctors throughout
different stages of one's military career.35
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Many challenges of the military patient-physician
relationship present themselves differently as the
military setting around the meeting of the patient and
physician change. For example, on one hand, the
military patient may not be as eager for the physician
to release him as a civilian would be if it meant a swift
return to the battlefield. On the other hand, a patient
may be more inclined to lie about symptoms and
pains if he is eager to perform his duties and wants to
return to the battlefield. Depending on which interests
the patient holds highest - either his own interests or
those of the patient's unit, mission, or nation - the
patient may make medical decisions and requests that
a civilian in the same situation would not make. These
include decisions such as requesting release to return
to battle before medically-ready or asking to remain
in the hospital after fully healing to avoid the same
result. In turn, the issues put pressure on the military
physician that he would not face in the civilian world.
It is not likely that a determination of whether to release
a patient or not has such drastic consequences on the lay
patient in a civilian hospital. Outside of certain medical
conditions that require extra attention from the doctor
after the patient leaves, the possibly extreme character
of the location of the release has an impact on both
the military patient and the military physician in their
relationship and decision-making.
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In the study of bioethics there are a few recurring
terms and, arguably, four main principles: Autonomy,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.36 Autonomy
is the principle usually assigned to the patient,
indicating that independent actions and choices of the
individual should not be constrained by others.37 To
act autonomously, the patient must act intentionally,
with understanding, and independently of controlling
influences. 38 Autonomy is the foundation for rules
relating to disclosure of information on the side of
the physician, and consent on the side of the patient.39
Paternalism on the part of the physician is in constant
conflict with the autonomy of the patient, and may
include actions such as withholding information from
the patient or going forward with a procedure despite
the wishes of the patient if the doctor believes it is in the
patient's "best interest." Informed consent is important
to the promotion of autonomy in medical decision-
making, 40 and requires the doctor to disclose material
information to the patient such as risks, discomforts,
benefits, side effects, alternatives, risks if left untreated,
and personal interests unrelated to the patient's health
prior to treatment. 41 Additional-and equally important
-concepts are the related non-maleficence and
beneficence. Non-maleficence is the principle that one
has a duty not to inflict evil, harm, or risk of harm on
others while beneficence is the principle that one has a
duty to help others by doing what is best for them. 42
Those who exercise command authority over military
personnel have an obligation to protect the rights,
dignity, and autonomy of their subordinates to the
greatest extent possible without jeopardizing the
military mission or the welfare of military personnel
as a whole.43 That said, in addition to conflicting
bioethical principles, a physician in the military will
confront the simultaneously competing interests of
multiple stakeholders throughout his career. First, the
physician has a duty to the patient. Depending on the
circumstances that bring the soldier into contact with
the physician, the physician may experience varying
relationships with the soldier. These can range from peace
time to on the battlefield, and even in the courtroom.44
Additionally, not only does the military physician see
the soldier as his patient, but also as his or her fellow
soldier. Second, the physician has an obligation to the
medical community's general standards and practices.
Despite the military physician's - at times - special
circumstances, the medical community has standards
and practices that it does not feel are ever appropriate
to compromise. 45 Third, the physician has a duty to the
military command and superior officers. Command
is the authority that a commander exercises over his
subordinates by virtue of his rank or assignment.46 One
cannot become a military doctor unless he or she is in
the military and accepts the obligations that come with
it. This subjects the physician to the same rules and
laws as any other soldier; physicians face the same
consequences for failing to followx orders. Fourth, the
physician has a responsibility for society, as a whole,
and the state's dependence on the proper functioning of
the military for safety and order. Because of the special
nature of the military and the importance of maintaining
good order, the military has its rules, regulations, and
disciplines to provide for a proper defense of the nation.
By joining the military, the doctor makes a promise to
put the needs of the command and society before his or
her own. 47
From the patient's point of view, his or her autonomy is already compromised
for the sake of the armed forces and national security. For example, "the
[Department of Defense], through administrative, 48 legislative, 49 and
executive 0 action obtained its own exception to the consent requirement,
which has been upheld despite constitutional challenge."' Under civilian
standards, consent to a drug or treatment is of the utmost importance. A
person of adult years of sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control
over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical
treatment.52 Patients in the military are bound to follow orders, and certain
federal provisions make it lawful to put the needs of the nation before those
of the patient.
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A major selling point for the military is its well-known and highly regarded
health care system.53 Congress took steps to create and maintain high
morale in the uniformed services by providing an improved and uniform
program of medical and dental care for members and certain former
members of those services and their dependants. 54 The health care program
serving active duty service members, retirees, their families, survivors,
and certain former spouses is called TRICARE. On its website, the
TRICARE program states that it "brings together the health care resources
of the uniformed services and supplements them with networks of civilian
health care professionals, institutions, pharmacies, and suppliers to provide
access to high-quality health care services while maintaining the capability
to support military operations." 56 The program covers a wide range of
services, including medical, dental, vision, mental health and behavior, and
life events 57 using both military and civilian physicians.
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As previously mentioned, the law of torts is an important aspect of
resolving disputes which stem from claims of medical malpractice
and negligence between patients and their physicians. 8 The medical
malpractice system has two primary goals: to compensate injured patients,
and to deter physicians from careless behavior.59 Allowing patients to
seek redress for the negligence of their physicians has forced changes in
the attitudes and behaviors of physicians, and led them to become more
accommodating to the needs of their patients. Knowing that their actions
could produce a liability has even led some hospitals to manage risk by
setting policies. 60 Furthermore, while in traditional negligence cases, the
duty not to act negligently applies among all persons regardless of their
relationship to one another, the idea behind medical malpractice liability
is that by undertaking the voluntary role of physician, the doctor creates a
special relationship between him or herself and the patient.6' In the medical
profession, the relevant standard of care is objective and looks to whether
the practice conforms to the standard of care practiced by another member
of the medical profession.62
Military doctors are different from most civilian doctors in that they are
not private individuals but employees of the federal government. In
fact, perhaps no relation between the government and a citizen is more
distinctively federal in character than that between the government and
members of its armed forces.63 While the Federal Tort Claims Act mandates
that the government shall be liable to the same extent as a private individual
under similar circumstances, 64 the statute also makes certain exceptions that
take away this privilege from members of the armed forces. The Supreme
Court in Feres v. United States held that the U.S. Government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or in the course of activity incident to service.65 This
means that a soldier has no means for redress from the negligence of his or
her military physician if the injury arises from activity incident to service. 66
In Feres, the Court held that the service members fail the test for applicable
claims against the government because: (1) the plaintiffs could not point
to the liability of a "private individual" even remotely analogous to their
claims; and (2) there is no liability "under like circumstances." 67 The
Court's analysis for the first reason said there was no analogous private
individual because the Court "knew of no American law which ever has
ever [sic] permitted a soldier to recover for negligence against either his
superior officers or the Government he is serving." 68 As for the second
reason, the Court said that there are no like circumstances because "no
private individual has the power to conscript or mobilize a private army
with such authorities as the Government vests in echelons of command." 69
It is important to note that in the Feres opinion, the Court did not mention
the patient-physician relationship or the standard for a medical breech, two
factors typically discussed in medical malpractice cases in civilian realm.
A key aspect under the Feres doctrine is that the outcome of the case varies
according to the status of the member of the military at the time of the
alleged injury. For example, in Madsen v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps
of Eng 'rs,70 the plaintiff was a Captain in the regular Air Force who was
on terminal leave expecting to retire in a month.71 He sustained injuries in
a motorcycle accident and sued the United States for the negligent acts of
Army medical personnel.72 The suit was barred under the Feres doctrine
because the court concluded that the treatment was incident to military
service and that the plaintiff was on active duty status.73 The court looked
to the fact that during his terminal leave and while on medical hold status,
the plaintiff was, in fact, on active duty status because he received active
duty pay, accrued annual leave, and accumulated credit for active duty time
later used in computing his military retirement pay.74 It did not matter that
the plaintiff was on terminal leave because, like other forms of military
leave, it could have been cancelled at any time and the service member
could have been ordered to return to duty.75 Correspondingly, the active
duty service member under medical care remains subject to the orders of
the hospital commander and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.76 These
are some of the factors considered by courts when determining the status
of the plaintiff and whether a negligence suit should be barred under the
Feres doctrine.
In United States v. Johnson, the Supreme Court upheld the Feres doctrine
and articulated three of the doctrine's underlying factors:77
First, the relationship between the Government and members of its Armed
Forces is 'distinctively federal in character'; it would make little sense
to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard
to any negligence attributable to the Government.78
Of note is the third factor, "the peculiar and special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects
of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or
negligent acts committed in the course of military duty
. . . ."79 The third factor carries the most weight, as
the Supreme Court specifically stated that the first two
rationales are "no longer controlling." 0 This makes the
strongest justification for the Feres doctrine consistent
with the UCMJ's rational for many of its laws - "for the
good order and discipline of the military."8'
Congress and the military made their priorities clear
by barring medical malpractice suits for the good order
and discipline of the military. Essentially, the military
holds barring suits on superior officers and good order
and discipline above the two main reasons for allowing
medical malpractice suits: redress for victims and
maintaining proper standards for medical personnel.
If one looks at the two rationales side by side, they do
seem to conflict. On one hand, if the military wants
efficient military functioning, it cannot allow soldiers to
question, second guess, and bring suit against superior
officers. On the other hand, if society wants the
medical community to maintain the utmost standards
of medical practice possible and provide redress for
those who are injured, it must allow patients to sue for
negligence. Faced with these two rationales for and
against malpractice suits, the Court in Feres chose the
option that ensured the good order and discipline of the
military.
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In case there were any questions left regarding whether
a member of the military could collect a remedy alleging
medical malpractice, in 1976 Congress enacted 10
U.S.C. § 1089(a). The Act's purpose is to fully protect
medical personnel from any potential personal financial
liability that might arise from the performance of official
medical duties. 82  Its effect is to provide complete
immunity for individual military doctors, even where it
leaves servicemen without remedy. 83 It protects against
suits for personal injuries, including death caused by
a negligent or wrongful act or omission, and protects
the following persons: physicians, dentists, nurses,
pharmacists, and paramedical or other supporting
personnel, including medical and dental technicians,
nursing assistants, and therapists if they are in the
armed forces, National Guard (under specified times),
the DOD, the Armed Forces Retirement Home, or the
Central Intelligence Agency.84
The plaintiff in Howell v. United States, outlined the
"Catch-22" situation in how 10 U.S.C. § 1089, when
combined with the Feres doctrine, left her without the
possibility of a remedy. " She made this argument
on the basis that 10 U.S.C. § 1089 makes the Federal
Tort Claims Act action against the United States the
exclusive remedy for negligence of military medical
personnel, yet Feres bars suits by servicemen against the
United States.86 While she argued that this contraction
indicated Congress could not have intended such a result
and urged for an alternate interpretation of 10 U.S.C. §
1089, the court ruled that the interpretation she sought
was not persuasive when viewed in light of the case
law developed prior to the enactment of the statute. 87
Furthermore, aside from wanting to maintain the good
order and discipline of the military by preventing
military personnel from suing for medical malpractice,
there was also a more practical reason why Congress
enacted 10 U.S.C. § 1089, which was to eliminate
the need for personal malpractice insurance for all
government medical personnel.88
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Peacetime is when the nation is not at war89 and the
soldier and physicians have no notice of an impeding
deployment. Times of peace are the instances when
a military patient-physician relationship most closely
mimics that of the patient-physician relationship in
the civilian world. While the military physician still
has duties to the command and nation, those interests
are lower than what they might be during a time of
war which, in turn, means peacetime indicates the
heightened interests and autonomy of the patient. Some
of the situations that may cause a military physician
to compromise principles for the good of the nation,
such as confidentiality or privacy in disclosing medical
information to superiors, are not present, and forced
vaccinations or treatment are not as necessary as they
might be if a soldier were preparing for war. The
environment is more stable and the soldier likely goes to
the medical officer on the base or near vicinity to where
he or she is stationed. While the nature of the military
requires military personnel to travel and move often,
during peacetime it is possible for the patient and the
physician to maintain a relationship that extends beyond
a passing check-up, and it is more likely that they can
build a long-lasting, trusting relationship.
The Feres doctrine and 10 U.S.C. §1089 still bar medical
malpractice suits for soldiers, even during peacetime,
so long as the soldier is acting in the course of duty.
However, the lack of a hectic situation may reduce
the need for such suits in the peacetime environment.
During peacetime there are less immediate needs, fewer
battlefield injuries, and fewer excuses for proceeding
with treatment without informed consent or for acting
with negligence. Yet, these same reduced stressors may
also be the reason that lifting the bar on malpractice
suits may be more appropriate at this stage. The lack of
hectic situation, the reduced interests of the command
and nation, and the raised autonomy of the military
patient make it less necessary to hold the physicians to
a different standard than their civilian counterparts. It
is more reasonable that a military physician working
in a hospital, while still subject to chains of command
and orders, could be held to the same objective standard
of care to which civilian doctors are held. Granted,
allowing malpractice suits in this peacetime setting
could result in a snowball effect of suits. Even in
peacetime, it is not in the nation's best interests to allow
soldiers to sue superiors because of orders. However, it
is worth considering that many of the factors that justify
overriding a military patient's autonomy in a battlefield or
pre-deployment stage are not present during peacetime,
so a suit may be more justified. While these reasons to
lift the bar make sense in the civilian world because of
the goals of malpractice law (i.e. redress and upholding
proper medical standards), it still would not override
the interests of the military and the rationale behind
the Feres doctrine and 10 U.S.C. § 1089's enactment -
avoiding suits against superiors for negligent orders.
The pre-deployment setting lasts from when the
soldier is alerted that he or she will deploy to the date
of deployment. As a nation moves closer to war, the
interests of the command and nation begin to rise
and, as a result, the interests of individuals fall. One
example of this is the Military Selective Service Act, 90
which signs certain qualified individuals up for military
service and possibly war whether or not they consent;
it is the means by which the United States administers
military conscription. These actions on the part of the
government are constitutional,91 and the government
sees service in the Army as duty owed to the state.92 At
these times a soldier can undergo treatment he or she
does not desire, be given vaccinations he or she does
not consent to, or receive unapproved drugs that he or
she did not knowx about nor giv e consent to receiv e. The
ever-conflicting paternalism of the military physician
rises and the autonomy of the soldier-patient falls.
Informed consent for vaccinations and treatments is one
clear principle of autonomy that the government will
compromise to achieve military success. For example,
prior to commencing Operation Desert Storm, the
combat phase of the Persian Gulf War, the DOD sought
and obtained a one-time waiver of informed consent
requirements, known as Rule 23(d), to permit the use
of investigational drugs and vaccines on American
Forces serving in the Persian Gulf.93 In persuading
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to waive
their requirements on the use of investigational agents
without obtaining consent from the soldiers, the DOD
argued that obtaining soldiers' informed consent was
"not feasible" in the exigencies of war."94 By following
the orders of the command and administering these
vaccinations without the informed consent of the
soldiers, the physicians showed increased paternalism,
and the military patients were subject to decreased
autonomy.
Additionally, it is arguable whether the physicians were
upholding or contradicting the important principles of
beneficence and nonmaleficence. On one hand, if the
vaccination saved a soldier's life, then the physician
may feel that he acted for the good of the patient while
simultaneously feeling that he harmed the patient by
administering the vaccine without the soldier's consent.
This is likely in contradiction with the Hippocratic
Oath, which every doctor must take, and is another
pressure exerted onto the military physician. If the
situation arose where the patient was demanding that the
physician not administer the vaccine, but the physician
received orders to administer the vaccine - adding
in the fact that it is a lawful order due to the waiver
obtained by the DOD - the physician would likely
have to administer the vaccine. This would tarnish the
autonomy of the soldier and, depending on how much
the military authorized the physician to reveal about
the vaccination, it may diminish the truth and veracity
principles for the physician.
In the civilian world, if a doctor performs a surgery
without the informed consent of a patient, it is
considered an assault, an unlawful touching, and the
patient would be able to seek redress through the court
system. In the military setting, however, there are two
issues that run contrary to the interests of the patient.
First, it is not always unlawful for a military physician
to administer treatment to a patient without his or her
informed consent as seen through the directives, orders,
and statutes enacted by Congress and the Executive
Branch. The military allows and sometimes orders
its physicians to administer vaccines, treatments, and
experimental drugs without the informed consent of
the patient or any consent at all from the soldier-patient
under certain narrow circumstances, in effect making
it a lawful touching. In the pre-deployment stage,
many of the environmental factors discussed in the next
section about the battlefield are not present, decreasing
the military necessity for such actions. However,
since the interests of the military and society are still
in heightened state and because the soldier is likely
deploying to a battlefield environment, the command
could still argue that it was militarily necessary to
administer the compulsory treatment.
Second, even if the touching was considered unlawful,
the military patient would still be barred from bringing
suit because of the Feres doctrine and 10 U.S.C § 1089.
While the soldier is in a pre-deployment position there
is little room to argue that the soldier is not on active
duty or acting within the course of military duty while
receiving compulsory treatment. Therefore, the courts
and Congress have effectively barred all personal injury
suits in order to maintain the discipline the military
so heavily relies upon to achieve the success of the
mission. The knowledge that a doctor is safe from a tort
action may further make it easier for him to administer
non-censual treatment or vaccinations, which further
keeps the physician and patient from achieving a well-
balanced relationship.
On the battlefield, it is common for the greatest medical
ethical dilemmas to arise.
Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a more challenging
environment in which to practice medicine than on a
battlefield. It is the antithesis of the ideal medical
setting. It is violent. It is noisy. It is chaotic. It is
in a constant flux. And it is unpredictable. Lack of
creature comforts is the least of the problems faced.
Noise levels prevent normal aspects of patient care.
Rapid movement, often on little or no advanced notice,
requires treatment facilities to be set up and taken down
very quickly. Patients can arrive before preparations
are completed. Medical personnel, as well as patients,
suffer from the fatigue and filth. 95
In addition to the challenging physical environment
surrounding physicians and patients, the physician has
the legal obligation to place the interests of society
(and the military mission of protecting and defending
that society) above those of the military patient. 96 In
situations of military necessity, such as on a battlefield,
military physicians must give absolute priority to
military needs, and therefore, will also give priority
to protecting and defending society when not doing so
would greatly sacrifice society's interests.97 In fact, the
Secretary of the Army may direct the medical care of
any individual on active duty and may determine that
the needs of the Army are so significant that they must
override those of the soldier-patient. 98 At this point, it is
likely that the strength of the autonomy of the patient is
at its lowest and the paternalism of the physician is at its
highest. This reduction in patient autonomy is in direct
correlation to the heightened interests of the command
and society during this time of war.
On the battlefield, the military physician faces issues
such as battlefield triage, 99 limited supplies, injured
enemies, questions of whether to administer euthanasia,
and return-to-duty considerations.' 00 For almost all of
these issues, the doctor must make decisions with the
interests of the military command and society in mind
first, and the individual soldier second. This is not to
say that the physician is not without any guidance. On
the battlefield, the physician applies the following rules,
listed in order of precedence, when priorities are in
conflict: (1) maintain medical presence with the solider;
(2) maintain the health of the command; (3) save lives;
(4) clear the battlefield; (5) provide state-of-the-art care;
and (6) return soldiers to duty as soon as possible.101
Military physicians have the duty to be as concerned
with the success of the military mission as they are with
their patients, and although returning soldiers to duty as
soon as possible is the lowest priority, there are likely
times when national interest may allow the military to
require soldiers to undergo life-saving or other medical
care to return to the front lines.
It does not always follow that it will hurt the military
patient if the military physicians obey their orders.
Oftentimes, due to the extreme nature of the battlefield
setting and the injuries brought to the attention of the
military physician, the physician may make risky
decisions to help save the soldier's life without his
or her first thought turning towards the military
mission or society as a whole. For example, in Iraq,
Army surgeons have become aggressive users of a
controversial drug called Factor VII, which promotes
clotting in cases of severe bleeding.102  Like in the
pre-deployment stage where soldiers may have to take
vaccines that the FDA has not yet approved, Factor VII
is still in a trial stage.103 However, the urgency of saving
a soldier's life in Iraq takes priority over possible ethical
conflicts.104 Furthermore, to improve the trauma care
which is a leading cause of death in war zones and is
the third leading cause of death in the Untied States, 0 5
top trauma surgeons strongly advocate conducting
clinical trials to improve trauma.106 These trials can be
ethically tricky "because trauma research can involve
trying novel treatments on severely injured patients
who cannot give informed consent." 07 However, the
dire situation in which many of the physicians find
themselves often justifies the use of risky, potentially
life-saving treatment.
Military physicians in a battlefield setting can also go the
opposite route with their paternalism and send soldiers
home using medical reasons as an excuse if they feel
that they can save a soldier's life by getting him or her
out of harm's way. This is most common with combat
stress disorder and was often experienced during the
latter stages of Vietnam. 0 s A physician's willingness to
send soldiers home early could result in the physician diagnosing a soldier
with a more serious psychological disorder, and further leave the soldier
with a sense of guilt for leaving his comrades because of the questionable
diagnosis.' 09 Furthermore, knowing of the existence of this less-than-
truthful option may leave the physician with a sense of guilt if he chooses
not to exercise that option.
The battlefield stage is also where the Feres doctrine and 10 U.S.C. § 1089
likely affect the patient-physician relationship most. Due to the loud and
hectic nature of the administration of medical care on the battlefield and
in clinics near the front lines, there is already a compromised relationship
between the military patient and the physician. It is possible to see how an
injured military patient would desperately look to the physician to save his
life or ease his pain with any means available. However, without the time
and opportunity to become familiar with one another, it is more likely that
the physician will also have to make snap decisions without consulting as
carefully with the military patient or the medical community as would be
expected in the civilian world. As a result, issues such as the administration
of treatment with less than perfect trial results, without informed consent,
or with a reduced standard of care could occur more easily. Congress has
already barred the ability of soldiers to seek redress from the government
and individual health care administrators for medical malpractice for the
good-order and discipline of the military. It has also made clear that if
a physician has orders to act a certain way in certain situations that may
impede the autonomy of the military patient, he or she must do so to avoid
violating orders and may do so without the fear of a medical malpractice
suit.
At the same time, in this setting, the Feres doctrine and 10 U.S.C. § 1089
restrictions may make the most sense from the physician's standpoint.
After all, it seems unfair to hold the same objective standard of care to
military physicians with conflicting orders in a hectic, dangerous, and often
dirty battlefield environment as is held to civilian doctors in hospitals and
office buildings. In this situation, it may be more appropriate to hold the
doctors to a "reasonable-under-the-circumstances" standard. It is also in
this situation when it is the most important for military personnel, both
soldiers and physicians, to follow orders immediately and without question.
Therefore, it is more likely that a physician on the battlefield will need
to follow standing orders to perform a certain operation or administer a
certain drug without receiving the informed consent of the military patient.
Here, the physician should feel the most secure that her actions are for the
good of society and the command, and further, that she does not have to
face a possible malpractice suit in the future. The thought that following
an order under these circumstances may eventually cause the physician to
face a malpractice suit would likely dampen the resolve of the physician
to follow that order and may compromise the success of the mission. This
would produce negative consequences for the physician, the command, and
society.
The fourth setting is in a post-deployment stage, which is arguably very
similar to the peacetime setting in terms of the levels of autonomy and the
importance of the interests of varying stakeholders. In comparison to the
battlefield setting, in post-deployment, there is likely an increased level of
autonomy of the military patient due to the diminished immediate concerns
of the command and nation. There is also a reduced opportunity for
paternalism on the part of the doctor as compared to the battlefield because
the post-deployment setting lacks the immediate and stressful nature that
was present on the battlefield. Unless the physician is working in an
emergency room setting, many of the hectic theater-of-war elements are
not present. For instance, the physician does not have to make immediate
decisions regarding whether the soldier can and should return to the front
lines." 0 There is more time to sit and discuss options with the military
patient, and at this stage, the doctor has the opportunity to listen more
closely to the needs and desires of the soldier who has just returned from the
battlefield. There are many resources available to post-deployed soldiers,
and the military and medical communities are sensitive to the issues that a
returned soldier may face."'
In this stage, however, there are also additional needs and concerns that are
not present in the previous settings because the soldier has just returned
from a high stress and dangerous situation. There is a substantial possibility
that the soldier is dealing with injuries in this quiet and not-urgent setting -
both physical and mental injuries - that the physician did not have to deal
with in the previous stages except when on the battlefield.112 One example
is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that, by definition, occurs after a
stressful event. PTSD is a unique diagnosis in that use of the term requires
determination of an external gatekeeping condition: exposure to an event
through "direct encounter or witness that involves actual or threatened
death or serious injury combined with a response involving intense fear,
helplessness, or horror."" 3 At this stage, the relationship between the
patient and his physician would likely depend on trust, veracity, privacy,
and open communication.
There is also the possibility of the issue arising that the soldier returns from
the front lines to be treated by a physician who had never deployed. In this
case, a soldier may not have the same trust in the physician that he might
have if the physician had been at battle and experienced the same stresses
and injuries as the military patient. It is possible that the military patient
feels he has more answers and experience than the physician, which may
make it more difficult for the soldier to accept the advice of the physician,
resulting in a conflict in their relationship. This is especially likely in the
cases of PTSD where the soldier may feel more comfortable with the person
administering his mental health plan if he or she has experienced the same
issues that the military patient is currently feeling." 4
It is in this post-deployment stage that the most mental harm could
result from a barred medical malpractice suit. After all, if a physician is
negligent in the treatment of an injured military patient who just returned
from a battlefield, the resulting injury may compound the stresses already
experienced by the military patient. She may feel that she did her part by
following orders, doing her job, and returning safely from enemy lines. It
would likely be mentally devastating for a soldier to have an injury with
no chance of recovery occur due to the negligence of her physician once
she made a safe return. In post-deployment, the soldier, in most cases,
remains on active duty, so the same concerns and desires for good order and
discipline still override the needs of the individual soldier and enforcement
of medical standards when in reference to the Feres doctrine and 10 U.S.C.
§ 1089's bar against medical malpractice suit.
In this stage, the physician should take the care and time to understand
the difficulties experienced by the military patient. There is a high chance
that the soldier just returned from the hectic situation described in the
"battlefield" section where her autonomy was at its lowest ebb. While it
is in the nature of the military for personnel to rotate duty stations every
so often, physicians and patients in this stage should do everything in their
power to maintain a stable atmosphere, as post-deployment is likely a
"healing" stage which requires consistency. In the post-deployment phase
it is important for the physician to understand the desires and concerns of
the patient to best meet those needs and develop a trusting and truthful
relationship.
S Con cl.u,",Sion
This article outlines the bioethical issues facing the patients-physician
relationship in the military. Both parties have challenges and pressures that
are foreign to those in the civilian world. While military physicians must be
as equally qualified to practice medicine as their civilian counterparts, they
are subject to different standards and have loyalties not only to the patient,
but also to the military command, society, and the medical community.
Military physicians should be cognizant of the fact that military patients'
level of autonomy rises and falls depending on the state of the military and
nation, and adjust his or her treatment behavior accordingly. In the cases
where the interests of the military override the wishes of the individual
soldier, the physician should do everything in his or her power to, at the
minimum, fully explain the treatment the soldier is about to receive.
Barring the ability of members of the military to collect damages from
instances of medical malpractice lowers the autonomy of the military
patient even further, and could possibly compromise the patient-physician
relationship. While the brunt of the responsibility falls on the physician to
ensure the welfare of the patient, the military physician is not the only party
here that should take extra precautions. Military patients should remember
that, while limited at times, they still have a say in their medical future.
It should be the goal of both the military patient and physician to discuss
issues of autonomy, paternalism, and conflicting loyalties, and to promote
an open dialogue about these sensitive issues.
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